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Abstract
Background: Advance directives (AD) imply the promise of determining future medical treatment in case of
decisional incapacity. However, clinical practice increasingly indicates that standardized ADs often fail to support
patients’ autonomy. To date, little data are available about the quality and impact of ADs on end-of-life decisions
for incapacitated acute stroke patients.
Methods: We analyzed the ADs of patients with fatal stroke, focusing on: (a) their availability and type, (b) stated
circumstances to which the AD should apply, and (c) stated wishes regarding specific treatment options.
Results: Between 2011 and 2014, 143 patients died during their hospitalization on our stroke unit. Forty-two of
them (29.4%) had a completed and signed, written AD, as reported by their family, but only 35 ADs (24.5%) were
available. The circumstances in which the AD should apply were stated by 21/35 (60%) as a “terminal condition that
will cause death within a relatively short time” or an ongoing “dying process.” A retrospective review found only 16
of 35 ADs (45.7%) described circumstances that, according to the medical file, could have been considered
applicable by the treating physicians. A majority of patients objected to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (22/35, 62.9%),
mechanical ventilation (19/35, 54.3%), and artificial nutrition (26/35, 74.3%), while almost all (33/35, 94.3%) directed that
treatment for alleviation of pain or discomfort should be provided at all times even if it could hasten death.
Conclusions: The prevalence of ADs among patients who die from acute stroke is still low. A major flaw of the ADs in
our cohort was their attempt to determine single medical procedures without focusing on a precise description of
applicable scenarios. Therefore, less than half of the ADs were considered applicable for severe acute stroke. These
findings stress the need to foster educational programs for the general public about advance care planning to facilitate
the processing of timely, comprehensive, and individualized end-of-life decision-making.
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Background
In the late 1970s, advance directives (ADs) [1] were in-
troduced in the US as means to shape end-of-life care
according to individuals’ wishes and preferences. It was
not until 2009, that the German Federal Parliament
passed a law that regulates the requirements and legit-
imacy of ADs, demanding written and personally signed
documents, which, in turn, are considered binding for
medical decision-making [2]. Standard AD forms
frequently encourage patients to determine which specific
medical treatments should (not) be applied – especially
life-sustaining treatments – if the patient is incapacitated
in the future. However, ADs have performed poorly in the
past in that only a minority of patients have completed
such documents [3, 4]. The potential reasons for low com-
pletion rates include a lack of knowledge among lay
people about individual medical procedures listed in ADs,
apprehension that life-sustaining treatment might be
stopped too soon when an AD is in place [3], and a funda-
mental reluctance to confront one’s owns end-of-life [5].
Considering the challenge of completing ADs, it is sur-
prising that professional consultation by healthcare
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providers [3, 6] is not regularly offered to support pro-
spective engagement in end-of life decision-making.
Even when an AD is completed, several problems with
its implementation may arise. Most patients prefer to
rely on standard AD forms and are reluctant to “micro-
manage” their own death [7], leaving much room for in-
terpretation of the patient’s wishes by physicians and/or
relatives in critical situations. Thus, several studies have
found that ADs have relatively little effect on end-of-life
decision-making [8, 9]. In order to improve end-of-life
care, substantial efforts have been undertaken to en-
hance the implementation and quality of ADs in order
to increase physicians’ knowledge about patients’ prefer-
ences [8, 10]. However, most studies of ADs have in-
cluded patients with diseases that traditionally are the
focus of palliative medicine, such as cancer, congestive
heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [8],
dementia [11], or HIV/AIDS [12]. In contrast, only a few
studies have evaluated the preferences for end-of-life
treatments in situations such as stroke [13, 14]. This is
particularly striking as stroke accounted for one of every
20 deaths in the US in 2011, leading to a total of
128,932 stroke deaths [15]. Based on data from the
WHO Mortality Database, 11% of all deaths in Europe
are attributable to stroke [16]. Consequently, there is an
urgent need to improve individualized and timely ad-
vance care planning with special regard to end-of-life
scenarios due to stroke.
In this study, we aimed to analyze ADs in dying stroke
patients. We concentrated on the predefined circum-
stances to which the individual AD should apply and the
stated choices for specific treatment options to retro-
spectively analyze the impact of the AD on end-of-life
decisions in stroke patients.
Methods
We identified all patients admitted with a diagnosis of
ischemic stroke or spontaneous intracranial hemorrhage
(ICH) who died during their hospitalization on our 29-
bed comprehensive stroke unit (SU) from January 2011
to December 2014. Ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke was
confirmed by CT or MRI of the brain for all the patients.
Out of these, we retrospectively analyzed the medical re-
cords of those patients with advance directives. Patients
with existing written ADs were included for further ana-
lyses. Patients with a remark in their charts indicating an
AD existed, according to their next of kin, but whose
AD was not available in the charts were excluded. Like-
wise, patients with a written power of attorney for
healthcare without a concomitant AD were excluded. In
order to estimate the prognosis in terms of early mortal-
ity risk as a basis for further decision-making, we retro-
spectively assessed two different well-established risk
scores of each patient at the time of admission (the
IScore [17] or ICH Score [18], and the Risk Score for In-
Hospital Death in Patients Admitted with Ischemic or
Hemorrhagic Stroke [19]).
We analyzed ADs according to the following criteria
and content: (a) type of AD, (b) applicability to the cir-
cumstances at presentation, and (c) specifications referring
to medical and therapeutic actions (such as diagnostic
procedures, nutrition, medication, and initiation of pallia-
tive measures).
Results
Patients
Of 4425 patients admitted with either ischemic stroke or
ICH, 143 patients died during the subsequent
hospitalization. Of these, 42 patients (29.4%) had com-
pleted and signed a written AD; however, at the time of
decision-making, only 35 ADs were available and could
be examined (Fig. 1). Thirteen of these 35 (37.1%) patients
were male. The mean age of all the patients was 83.3 ±
8.5 years at the time of the stroke. Twenty-nine of the 35
(82.9%) patients had been admitted with a diagnosis of is-
chemic stroke and 6 (17.1%) had suffered from an ICH.
From a clinical perspective, most of the patients were se-
verely affected, with a median score of 19 (range = 5–26)
at admission on the National Institute of Health Stroke
Scale (NIHSS). The proportion of deceased patients with
signed ADs increased over the observation period, from
22.6% having an AD in 2011 to 43.6% in 2014.
With regard to the mortality assessment IScore [17], 7
of the 29 (24.1%) patients with ischemic stroke had a
score >221, indicating a predicted 30-day mortality of
57.6%. Of these, only 1 patient had a score indicating a
predicted 30-day mortality of 80 and 90%, respectively
(Fig. 2a). With respect to the ICH score [18], 1 patient
had a score of 3, which predicted a 30-day mortality of
72%, and no patient had a score of 4 (predicting a 30-
day mortality of 97%) or 5 (predicting a 30-day mortality
of 100%; Fig. 2b). Applying a categorical risk score for
both ischemic and hemorrhagic stroke (a model includ-
ing the NIHSS Score [19]), no patient achieved a score
that was associated with a >50% risk of in-hospital
mortality.
Of the 35 patients, 26 (74.3%) had at least one chronic
disease which was either potentially life-limiting or pre-
disposed them to a possible persistent inability to make
decisions. The presence of single or multiple advanced
organic diseases was diagnosed in 10 patients (28.6%),
including end-stage renal disease with hemodialysis (3/
35, 8.6%), congestive heart failure (6/35, 17.1%), and
chronic obstructive lung disease (2/35, 5.7%). Eight pa-
tients (22.9%) suffered from cardiovascular disease with
severe sequelae, either with a diagnosis of previous
stroke (5/35, 14.3%) or prior myocardial infarction (1/35,
2.9%), or both (2/35, 5.7%). Six patients (17.1%) had a
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diagnosis of cancer, and nine patients suffered from a
neurodegenerative disease (dementia in 6/35, 17.1%;
Parkinson’s disease in 2/35, 5.7%; and both diseases in
1/35, 2.9%).
AD forms
All ADs fulfilled the minimal legal requirements, that is:
a written form that was personally signed. Twenty-three
ADs were witnessed; 10 by the primary care physician,
10 by a notary, 2 by a family member, and 1 by both the
primary care physician and a family member. Of the 10
physicians who signed an AD, only 4 physicians stated
that the criteria of informed consent or refusal had been
fulfilled. Five physicians only confirmed the decision-
making capacity, and 1 physician signed the AD without
making any comments. Only 2 ADs had been updated
and reconfirmed; the oldest AD was 15 years old and the
most recent AD had been signed 19 days prior to the
stroke. Twenty-nine patients (82.9%) also had named a
power of attorney for healthcare. Of the 25 patients with-
out notarial certified ADs, all except 1 patient used stand-
ard AD forms, as provided by the German Department of
Justice, medical associations, or patients’ associations.
AD content
Applicability to severe stroke
At the time of presentation, all 35 patients were incap-
able of decision-making due to either global aphasia, dis-
turbance of consciousness, or severe neuropsychological
deficits. There was considerable variety concerning the
stated circumstances in which the AD should apply (see
Table 1). The most frequent was for a “terminal condi-
tion that will cause death within a relatively short time”
or ongoing “dying process” which was included in 21 of
the 35 ADs (60%). Other common terms included situa-
tions of “permanent unconsciousness/irreversible coma”
(48.6%), “irreversible loss of ability to reason/of power of
judgment/of decision-making ability” (34.3%), “end-stage
condition of an incurable/fatal disease, even if death is
not yet conceivable” (31.5%), and “permanent brain dam-
age” (28.6%). About one quarter wanted the AD to apply
in case of “advanced degenerative brain disease with
need for artificial nutrition” or “failure of vital functions”
(25.7% each). Only a minority stated that the AD should
cover situations involving “most severe physical dis-
ability/disease,” “intolerable pain” (8.6% in each), “no
improvement over 3 weeks after severe stroke” (5.7%)
or “no will to live” (2.9%). Only 1 patient made per-
sonal amendments with regard to his chronic disease
(Parkinson’s disease).
In order to appreciate patients’ wishes for end-of-life
care, we retrospectively analyzed, based on the medical
files, whether each AD would have been considered ap-
plicable in the course of medical treatment by employing
the already mentioned model-based prediction of prog-
nosis, combined with the clinicians’ recorded assess-
ments. The phrasing most applicable in the presented
clinical conditions was “permanent brain damage,”
which was accurate in 9 of 10 (90%) patients. The criter-
ion of “most severe physical disability/disease” and “irre-
versible loss of ability to reason/of power of judgment/of
decision-making ability” was fulfilled in 2 of 3 (66.7%)
Fig. 1 Cohort selection
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and 6 of 12 (50%) patients, respectively. A “failure of
vital functions” occurred in 1 of 9 (11.1%) patients, while
none of the other statements covered the clinical situa-
tions recorded in the medical files. It was particularly chal-
lenging to evaluate situations, such as “terminal condition
that will cause death within a relatively short time/dying
process” and the “end-stage condition of an incurable/fatal
disease, even if death is not yet conceivable.” Based on the
results of the risk-score assessment at the time of admis-
sion, a reliable prognosis of fatality could only be made
during further progression of the disease, depending on
clinical developments. In total, only 16 of the 35 patients
(45.7%, including multiple applying assignments in 2
patients) had chosen a description of circumstances that
indeed applied to the presented clinical situation.
AD treatment specifications
There also was considerable variation in refusing specific
treatments under the named clinical condition. A
majority of the 35 patients objected to cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (62.9%), mechanical ventilation (54.3%),
and artificial nutrition (74.3%). Only a few patients expli-
citly stated they did not want hydration (11.4%), antibiotics
(5.7%), or hemodialysis (2.9%). No patient commented on
his/her preference about blood transfusions. Eight of the 35
patients refused to allow organ donation upon his/her
death. Thirty-three patients (94.3%) directed that treatment
for alleviation of pain or discomfort should be provided at
all times even if it could hasten death.
Treatment specifications were quite similar when ana-
lyzing only the 16 ADs that were judged to apply to the
actual clinical situation. Most of these patients objected
to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (10/16), mechanical
ventilation (9/16), and artificial nutrition (11/16). Yet,
there were comments about hydration (5/16), antibiotic
therapy (2/16), hemodialysis (3/16), blood transfusion
(3/16), and organ donation (2/16). In general, refusal of
specific treatments was respected by the treating
A
B
Fig. 2 Outcome prognosis of our cohort according to the IScore for patients with ischemic stroke (a) and according to the ICH Score for patients
with intracerebral haemorrhage (b)
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physicians if the AD was found to be applicable. The
only exceptions were continuation of nutrition in 1 of
the 16 patients and continuation of hydration in 3 of the
16 patients, despite their explicit refusal (Fig. 3).
Implementation of ADs
A limitation of therapeutic measures at any time point
during the clinical course was documented in 34 of the
35 patients; a do-not-resuscitate order was implemented
for 1 patient with referral to his AD. In 21/35 patients,
an additional waiver of intensive care measures was doc-
umented in 11/20 with referral to the AD, in 9/20 after
discussing the treatment limitation with the next of kin
or legal guardian in order to elaborate the patient’s
putative will, and in 1 patient without a documented
decision-making process. Comfort care measures only
were initiated for 12 of the 35 patients. This was done
for 9 patients with reference to their AD, for 2 patients
after discussing the treatment limitation with the next of
kin, in order to elaborate on the patient’s putative will,
and for 1 patient without a documented decision-
making process.
Discussion
This retrospective study explored the occurrence, con-
tent, and implications of ADs recorded in the charts of
acute stroke patients who were admitted and subse-
quently died during hospitalization. Written ADs were
Table 1 Stated circumstances in which the individual advance directive should apply
Qualifying scenario Listed in Applicable in index event If scenario was interpreted to include:
Terminal condition that will cause death within
a relatively short time/dying process
21 (60.0%) ?
Permanent unconsciousness/irreversible coma 17 (48.6%) 0 (0.0%)
Irreversible loss of ability to reason/of power of
judgment/of decision-making ability
12 (34.3%) 6 (50.0%) Global aphasia
End-stage condition of an incurable/fatal disease,
even if death is not yet conceivable
11 (31.4%) ?
Permanent brain damage 10 (31.4%) 9 (90.0%) (Sub)total MCA infarction (n = 5)
Bilateral MCA infarction (n = 1)
Basal ganglia hemorrhage > 50 ml (n = 2)
Basilar artery occlusion (n = 1)
Advanced degenerative brain disease with need
of artificial nutrition
9 (25.7%) 0 (0.0%)
Failure of vital functions 9 (25.7%) 1 (11.1%) Sepsis with multiple organ failure
Most severe physical disability/disease 3 (8.6%) 2 (66.7%) Hemiplegia, bedridden
Intolerable pain 3 (8.6%) 0 (0.0%)
No improvement over 3 weeks after severe stroke 2 (5.7%) 0 (0.0%)
No will to live perceptible 1 (2.9%) 0 (0.0%)
Fig. 3 Treatment specifications of 16 patients with ADs applicable in the acute stroke setting: Number of patients who gave or withdrew/withheld
specific therapies based on the AD content
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found in only 35 out of 143 charts between the years
2011 and 2014. Yet, we noticed a progressive rise in ADs
during the course of the observation period. Most ADs
were preprinted standardized forms that contained no
individualized reference to the signer or to stroke-
related scenarios. Instead, the ADs mostly referred to
specific stand-alone medical options and clinical states,
which with lay people usually are not familiar.
AD-related obstacles for self-determined end-of-life-care
In accordance with nationwide and international obser-
vations, our data confirmed that the elderly are increas-
ingly attempting to take pertinent actions to determine
their own end-of-life care [20, 21]. Indeed, over the 4-
year-period of this study the proportion of deceased
stroke-patients that had an AD nearly doubled, reaching
43.6% in 2014. In addition, 82% of the AD signers had
designated a future surrogate. Yet, the findings still indicate
low engagement with the topic, given the documented
incremental need for autonomous end-of-life decision-
making within populations in western cultures [22].
To date, consistent with our findings, most AD-
holders in Germany use standard AD forms that are
provided by several institutions [23]. On one hand, these
forms are useful because they only require a person to
choose singular stand-alone treatment options. On the
other hand, standardized ADs mostly fail to reflect the
complexity of specific scenarios in critical illness. More-
over, the impact of a critical illness on an individual’s life
might be ever so unpredictable and complex that it can-
not be judged in advance, as critics of ADs have stressed
[5, 24]. However, some scenarios for progressive chronic
diseases may be foreseeable. In our study, 26 patients
(74.3%) had at least one chronic disease that was poten-
tially life-limiting or predisposed them to future states of
decisional inability. Likewise, 14.3% had an instance of
stroke in their medical history. Surprisingly, only one pa-
tient made a personal amendment to the AD with spe-
cial regard to his progressive (Parkinson’s) disease.
Obviously, the majority of patients did not (want to) an-
ticipate the potential course of their health conditions
and correspondently did not take the best possible
actions to regulate their end-of-life care. In a study by
Hawkins et al., only a few individuals wished to document
preferences and mandate that specific life-sustaining treat-
ments should be followed without exception [7]. This
could be one reason for the low completion rates of ADs,
which press individuals to make such declarations. Yet,
imprecise definitions of treatment choices are commonly
regarded as a weakness of ADs. As Qureshi et al. [9] dis-
cuss, the poor impact of ADs may be due to an insuffi-
cient specification of treatments that patients can choose
or refuse. In our study, patients used forms that had them
comment on measures, such as antibiotic treatment or
hemodialysis. A case can be made that specific therapeutic
options should be left to the treating physicians, according
to medical indications in relation to given contexts.
Spokoyny et al. [25] proposed a specific AD for stroke
that aimed at coordinating treatment options for stroke
scenarios related to time windows and evidence levels.
The authors claim to support patients’ autonomy by pro-
viding adequate information that has a decisive effect on
therapeutic decision-making [25]. However, the contrary
may be the case: leaving evermore specific treatment
decisions to non-medically trained individuals – particu-
larly, within a highly specific and fictional medical
context – may lead to overextended and burdensome
advance decision-making, which may not lead to in-
creased autonomy. One main flaw of ADs may be, in
fact, their lack of reference to treatment goals, since
ADs focus mainly on therapeutic measures. Several au-
thors have concluded that the concept of ADs has failed
to accomplish what they were originally conceived to do;
namely, to enable individuals to determine their future
medical care based on the principle of informed consent
[26]. White and Arnold [27] point out that treatment-
limiting ADs, in the first place, give legal (likewise psy-
chological) permission to surrogates and doctors to stop
life-support in designated circumstances after life-
support already has been initiated. Yet, it is preferable to
clarify if such measures should be initiated after all.
Questioning AD quality in acute stroke context
Evaluating the quality of ADs in terms of their applic-
ability (relevance in the presented clinical condition) and
validity (phrasing that reflects the informed attitude of
the signer) requires that their wording be given close at-
tention. In our study, only 16 of 35 ADs were judged to
fit the clinical assessment in our retrospective analyses.
Thus, the complexity of decision-making processes
could certainly not be fully reconstructed and evaluated
on a retrospective basis. Decisions about life-sustaining
measures for “terminal conditions” or an “ongoing dying
process,” which were stated in 60% of the ADs, should
be based fundamentally on arguments about medical
futility rather than on the patient’s wishes. Yet, in our
study it appeared to be difficult to estimate current situ-
ations as being fatal. Most obviously, pre-formulated ter-
minology as “permanent brain damage” or “most severe
disability” demand close scrutiny of the pertinent under-
lying concepts while attempting to convert the for-
warded patient’s will. While medical professionals might
focus on neuro-anatomic damages that most probably
lead to severe disability, most lay people might instead
bear in mind (permanent) functional losses (e. g., not be-
ing able to walk, or to attend to own bodily needs, global
aphasia, etc.). Respectively, the idea of future impairment
of capabilities raises fundamental fears and questions
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about intrinsic values in life and what is considered to
be a good quality of life. The findings of Hanger et al.
showed that 82% of controls preferred death to the se-
vere disability caused by stroke [28]. Similarly, a recent
study assessed healthcare workers’ opinions about ac-
ceptable stroke outcomes following decompressive
hemicraniectomy (a procedure that reduces mortality
rates but may lead to severe disability). Most participants
stated survival with dependency to be unacceptable [29].
However, the retrospective consent rates in stroke survi-
vors after the procedure ranged between 79 and 100%
[30–32]. This emphasizes the disability paradox, as pref-
erences may change over time with a decline in health
and may lead to a higher acceptance of given states
[33, 34]. It is undisputed that little can be known
about patients’ deliberations while completing ADs if
there is no (written) evidence of the underlying deci-
sion process or a link to individual health-related
values. In our study, only 4 out of 10 physicians who
countersigned ADs stated that the informed consent
criteria had been fulfilled. Unfortunately, there is a
wide range of possibilities for misinterpretation on
behalf of the signers and later by their surrogates and
doctors. Once again, this calls into question whether
current AD practices are a satisfactory and effective
tool for legitimizing (crucial) medical actions.
Need for deliberated advance care planning for stroke-
related conditions
A conclusive implementation of valuable, action-guiding
ADs in stroke settings has to reflect that, in contrast to
other chronic diseases, severe stroke has its unique ill-
ness trajectory with special implications [35, 36]. Stroke
occurs unexpectedly and patients present at their worst,
having an uncertain short-term risk of mortality or a
likely long-term period of disability. Furthermore, all
communication has to take place through patients’ sur-
rogates [37]. Medical lay people should obtain adequate
information about the goals, means, and limitations of
ADs. The content of ADs concerning choices between
specific medical procedures should be made as compre-
hensible as possible for lay people. It is advisable that pa-
tients’ perceived preferences should be appropriately
phrased and reevaluated periodically [38]. It is essential
to reassess ADs in the light of the diagnosis of a severe
illness, a decline in one’s health condition, or when an
incisive life-event occurs, and to document personal in-
volvement with regard to achievable and preferable treat-
ment goals [39]. In addition, assistance by healthcare
professionals should be mandatory in the AD completion
processes. Finally, it is highly recommended that patients
appoint a healthcare proxy who is familiar with their
health-related values. The advancement of decision-
making-instruments is illustrated by the advance-care
planning model proposed by den Schmitten et al. for
emergency cases [40]. In a structured AD amendment pa-
tients may choose between diverse options: “life-prolong-
ing therapy without restrictions (A).” “life-prolonging
therapy with the following restrictions: do not resuscitate
(B1), in addition, do not intubate (B2), in addition, no in-
tensive care treatment (B2), in addition, no hospitalization
(B4)” or “no life-prolonging therapy at all, comfort care
only (C).” This catalogue provides a manageable size of
options and serves as one component of advance care
planning based on careful deliberation.
Study’s limitations
The present study has several limitations. The sample
size was small because of the low rate of completed
ADs. As the study was a retrospective chart analysis, de-
tails about the interpretation of ADs that were not noted
in the charts could be missing. Furthermore, only pa-
tients who died during their hospitalization were in-
cluded, since we assumed that the ADs in this cohort
would, in fact, be noticed and considered. This approach
carried the risk of overlooking a withdrawal-of-care bias
[41], and calls attention to the topic of refusal of medical
treatments in circumstances of almost imminent death.
However, the focus of our study was primarily to evalu-
ate the applicability and validity of ADs in patients with
fatal stroke rather than analyzing their impact on
decision-making processes on a more differentiated
long-term basis. Certainly, it would be valuable to
analyze the ADs of all patients with severe stroke, irre-
spective of patients’ outcomes as the determinant vari-
able. Further prospective long-term studies are needed
to elucidate this issue.
Conclusions
ADs should enable individuals to have their wishes
respected in future treatment decisions in case of incap-
acity. Yet, the prevalence of ADs among patients who
die from acute stroke is still low. In our cohort, less than
half of the existing ADs were considered to be applicable
for severe acute stroke. From the clinicians’ point of
view, the use of standardized ADs is not likely to sup-
port the intended autonomy of patients. There is a need
to foster educational programs for the general public
about advance care planning, especially in the light of
the large number of stroke-related conditions in the
aging population.
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